Russia has spent decades building one of the world's most sophisticated digital surveillance systems. Now, the Kremlin is taking steps to make it faster, more automated and better integrated across the country's internet infrastructure.

Known as SORM, the platform gives Russia's security and intelligence agencies access to telephone calls, internet traffic and other electronic communications passing through domestic networks.

New regulations published by Russia's Ministry of Digital Development at the end of May updated the technical standards governing SORM, formally known as the System for Operative Investigative Activities.

"Previously, the general requirement was relatively straightforward: operators had to install SORM equipment and provide authorized agencies with access when required. The updated rules go much further by specifying how information must be searched, processed and transmitted," said Timofei Dubrovskikh, a researcher at digital rights nonprofit RKS Global.

The authorities also expanded the range of searchable data available within the system, including full names, passport information, tax identification numbers, addresses, usernames, domains, URLs, corporate records, device identifiers and geographic coordinates.

According to Dubrovskikh, the primary value of the system lies not in intercepting the content of communications itself but in constructing comprehensive digital profiles that connect phone numbers, SIM cards, devices, IP addresses, user accounts and locations into a single searchable network.

"The overall objective is to enable SORM to quickly establish links between individuals, devices, networks, accounts and online activity," he told Recorded Future News.

More control, less dissent

The Ministry of Digital Development said the new rules are necessary to support national security. Privacy advocates, however, argue that the changes will further strengthen the government's already far-reaching ability to monitor people's digital activity.

According to Natalia Krapiva, senior tech counsel at digital rights group Access Now, the new requirements appear intended to reinforce the perception that online activity is constantly monitored.

Russia has repeatedly experimented with nationwide internet disruptions during periods of political tension, but such outages have proven unpopular even among politically neutral citizens. More targeted digital surveillance allows authorities to identify dissent while keeping services online, encouraging self-censorship rather than outright disruption, Krapiva told Recorded Future News.

"There's a need to exert more control over the population," she said. "The authorities want to create the feeling that everything is controlled and listened to, so it's better not to express disagreement online."

The regulations could also reshape Russia's telecommunications market. Complying with SORM requirements requires providers to deploy specialized hardware, storage systems and dedicated communications infrastructure capable of collecting, processing and transmitting data in government-mandated formats — an investment that can cost millions of rubles and falls especially hard on smaller internet providers.

Those could accelerate consolidation around larger operators with closer ties to the state, reducing competition and making it easier for the Kremlin to monitor and control the sector, according to Krapiva.

Operators that fail to comply face more than financial penalties. Noncompliance can trigger licensing problems, regulatory scrutiny, delays in network approvals and other administrative sanctions that could threaten the survival of smaller providers, Dubrovskikh said.

Broader impact

The new SORM regulations extend far beyond traditional telecommunications companies. They apply to all "information dissemination organizers" and operators of autonomous systems — a category that, according to Russian independent outlet Meduza, could encompass hosting providers, data centers, cloud operators, major technology companies, banks, universities and large corporations that manage their own internet infrastructure.

“Traditionally, SORM was primarily associated with telephone networks, mobile operators and internet service providers. However, the modern internet has become far more complex,” Dubrovskikh said, adding that simply tapping telecom operators is no longer enough.

Instead, security agencies increasingly seek to correlate a web of technical identifiers, including phone numbers, SIM cards, devices, IP addresses, user accounts, domains, URLs, geolocation data and subscriber information.

For ordinary Russians, there is little practical way to opt out.

Because SORM operates within telecommunications infrastructure rather than on users' devices, it cannot simply be disabled through software settings. Virtual private networks (VPNs) may obscure some browsing activity from internet providers but cannot hide the existence of the VPN connection itself, while metadata and network relationships remain visible to authorities, according to Dubrovskikh.

By linking fragmented data into a single searchable network, SORM is evolving into a system that can map not only what people say online, but also how they connect, move and interact across the internet.

"The new regulations strengthen not so much traditional wiretapping as the government's ability to rapidly collect and correlate disparate digital traces," Dubrovskikh said. "In that sense, they move SORM closer to functioning as a large-scale surveillance infrastructure."